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ABSTRAC T. Federal prosecutors are subject to a bewildering array of ethical regulations
ranging from state ethical codes to local rules adopted by federal courts to the internal policies of
the Department of Justice. The inconsistent and overlapping application of these ethical rules has
led to regulatory confusion that has inhibited the development of clear ethical expectations for
federal prosecutors. To ensure the consistent enforcement of federal criminal law, a uniform
system of ethical regulation- dividing regulatory authority amongst the courts, the Department
of Justice, and a yet-to-be-created independent ethical review commission- should be adopted to
replace the existing regulatory framework.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the Department of Justice launched "Operation Senior Sentinel" to
uncover and dismantle telemarketing rings that were making fraudulent offers
or bill collection calls to elderly citizens.' In one instance, a fraudster convinced
an elderly woman to forward nearly $30,000 as an "up front fee" to recover
$84,000 that she had lost in a previous scam.' To root out telecommunications
fraud targeting the elderly, the Department of Justice enlisted the cooperation
of AARP members, who became undercover witnesses for the FBI, recording
conversations with telemarketers suspected of fraudulent activity.' The effort
was wildly successful, leading to over four hundred indictments within the first
few months.4
On May 9, 1992, a gunman shot and killed four people sitting on the porch
of their home in Detroit; Loreal Roper, a three-year-old girl, was among them.'
One of the victims, Alfred Austin, had been "marked for death" by a drug
trafficking ring, the "Best Friends," after a defense attorney warned that Austin
was planning to cooperate with the authorities. 6 Subsequently, a woman
approached the federal prosecutors investigating the case and informed them
that her son, a defendant represented by counsel, wished to cooperate but was
afraid that his attorney would inform the Best Friends.' Prosecutors contacted
the man and, after corroborating his story, moved for a new attorney to be
appointed.8 The cooperation of this man was a key break in the case, ultimately
leading to the arrest and conviction of Loreal's killer.'
Under ethical regulations in place today, which make federal government
lawyers "subject to State laws and rules" of any state in which they engage in
1. Telescams Exposed: How Telemarketers Target the Elderly: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on
Aging, 104 th Cong. 7 (1996) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid).
2. Id. at 57 (statement of Kathryn Landreth, United States Attorney, District of Nevada).
3. Id. at 97-98 (statement of Charles L. Owens, Chief, Financial Crimes Section, Federal
Bureau of Investigation).
4. Id.
5. The Effect of State Ethics Rules on Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Conm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 65 (1998) [hereinafter
McDade Hearing] (statement of Richard L. Delonis, President, National Association of
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"attorney's duties,"o it is doubtful that federal prosecutors would be able to
participate in programs such as Operation Senior Sentinel in those states that
prohibit the recording of telephone conversations without the consent of both
parties." Nor would the Department of Justice be able to make the sort of ex
parte contact with represented persons that led to the conviction of Loreal
Roper's killer in certain states, despite DOJ policies to the contrary."
Federal prosecutors are subject to a bewildering array of ethical regulations
ranging from state ethical codes to local rules adopted by federal courts to the
internal policies of the Department of Justice. The inconsistent and
overlapping application of these ethical rules has led to regulatory confusion
and has inhibited the development of clear ethical expectations for federal
prosecutors. Consequently, prosecutors may find themselves subject to ethical
sanction for good-faith mistakes as to what ethical regulations require" or may
shy away from legitimate exercises of prosecutorial authority where the ethical
constraints are unclear.
It is imperative to develop ethical standards that take proper account of the
position of federal prosecutors within our legal system.'" The criminal justice
system is capable of inflicting society's most severe sanctions and represents
the public interest in justice." Moreover, the role that the modern American
prosecutor plays in the administration of that system is unique, not fully
analogous to either a neutral factfinder or a zealous advocate.'" The current
regulatory framework is insensitive to the practical and ethical distinctions
between federal prosecutors and other lawyers. A uniform, national ethical
10. 28 U.S.C. 5 53oB(a) (20o6).
n1. See McDade Hearing, supra note 5, at 64-65.
12. A number of states permit contact with represented parties provided that the contact is
"authorized by law." Federal prosecutors often may be able to argue that their contacts are
authorized. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade
Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2091 (2000) [hereinafter Note, Federal Prosecutors].
However, Florida has foreclosed this argument by removing the "authorized by law"
exception. See FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2; Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra at
2091. Such a rule would have prevented the federal prosecutor from soliciting the
cooperation of the defendant in Loreal Roper's case.
13. See Ryan E. Mick, Note, The Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act: Solution or Revolution?, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1251, 1287 & n.2o6 (2ool).
14. See, e.g., In re Doe, 8o F. Supp. 478, 479-80 (D.N.M. 1992) ("[W]e must understand
ethical standards are not merely a guide for the lawyer's conduct, but are an integral part of
the administration of justice.").
15. See Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little
Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 69 (1995).
16. See infra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
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code, tailored specifically to federal prosecutors, is needed to ensure the
development of consistent ethical norms consonant with the federal
government's interest in serving justice through the criminal law.
Part I of this Note examines the key features of the regulatory scheme
governing the conduct of federal prosecutors. Particular attention is paid to the
McDade Amendment, which, although it did not effect serious changes in the
de facto regulation of prosecutors, has served to highlight and entrench the
inconsistencies and regulatory difficulties of the present system. Part II
considers some of the proposals for reform that have emerged in the years
following the adoption of the McDade Amendment. Although they relieve
many of the most serious difficulties of the post-McDade regime, these
proposals either fail to ensure consistency in federal criminal enforcement or
impinge too greatly on other important normative considerations.
An understanding of the unique structural and political realities of the
enforcement of federal criminal law is essential to the development of a
substantive body of ethical regulation that adequately balances the need for
guiding prosecutorial discretion with the government's interest in vigorously
investigating and prosecuting federal crimes. Part III makes the case for a
uniform national codification of ethical rules specifically tailored to the
demands of federal prosecution. Such a code would allow detailed
consideration of the needs of federal prosecutors, permit consistent application
and enforcement of ethical rules across jurisdictions, and intrude minimally on
the authority of states to regulate lawyers who they have licensed to practice.
Finally, Part IV considers the capacity of various institutions -including the
Department of Justice, federal courts, and Congress - to develop and enforce
such a code and suggests a distribution of rulemaking and enforcement power
that allows the development of consistent ethical rules while preserving, as
much as possible, traditional claims of regulatory authority.
1. THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
Control over the administration of criminal justice has historically been
entrusted to a diverse set of actors spanning all branches of government, at
both the state and federal level. Even within the executive branch, control over
the criminal process was fairly diffuse in the early Republic." Indeed, from the
17. See generally Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286-303 (1989) (describing the dispersal of supervisory
authority of the criminal system among executive branch officials and the potential for
private citizens to participate).
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creation of the office in 1789 until 1820, federal district attorneys were not
subject to the supervision of any executive branch official.' Today, the ethical
conduct of federal prosecutors remains subject to numerous regulatory bodies,
including federal courts, state bar associations, and the Department of Justice
itself. Each of these bodies has developed a distinct set of standards and
policies that constrain the conduct of federal prosecutors, and each is
independently capable of issuing sanctions for ethical violations. As a result,
federal prosecutors have no clear guidance to inform their decisionmaking and
instead find themselves subject to a host of potentially conflicting ethical
regulations and guidelines.
A. Controversy Surrounding the Ethical Regulation ofFederal Prosecutors
The debate over the appropriate mechanisms for the ethical regulation of
federal prosecutors has focused on a conflict between the Department of Justice
and the courts over whether the former could suspend the application of the
"no-contact rule" to federal prosecutions. The no-contact rule, codified in Rule
4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, provides that in
"representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is
authorized to do so by law."19
In 1989, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh issued a memorandum
asserting that Disciplinary Rule 7-1o4(A)(1) of the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility,2 o Model Rule 4.2, and their various state professional
code analogues were not binding on federal prosecutors." Although Attorney
General Thornburgh conceded that compliance with state and local ethical
is. See ANGELA J. DAvis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 11
(2007).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010).
20. Model Code of Professional Responsibility section 7-1o4(A)(1) is the predecessor of Model Rule
4.2 and substantively quite similar. It provides:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY S 7-lo4(A)(i) (1981).
21. Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Att'y Gen., to All Justice Dcp't Litigators,
Communication with Persons Represented by Counsel (June 8, 19 89 ), reprinted in In re Doe,
801 F. Supp. 478, 489-93 (D.N.M. 1992) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memo].
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requirements will rarely be precluded by federal duties," he asserted that
federal regulations must control "in the rare instance where an actual conflict
arises."2 ' To support this conclusion, the Thornburgh Memo relied primarily
on the Supremacy Clause and separation-of-powers principles, arguing that
state and local rules cannot interfere with the regulations adopted by the
federal government.' The Thornburgh Memo's conclusions were subject to
harsh criticism," and the aggressive contention that federal courts could not
hold federal prosecutors to a more exacting standard than DOJ regulations
26
even caught the attention of Congress. Ultimately, however, no overriding
legislation was adopted.
In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno officially codified the conclusions of
the Thornburgh Memo by issuing a series of comprehensive regulations
governing the ethical responsibility of federal prosecutors and establishing
disciplinary provisions.2' These regulations, known collectively as the "Reno
Rule," took a very narrow view of the authority of states to subject federal
government lawyers to their own ethical regulations 9 and, in some cases,
authorized conduct expressly forbidden by the majority of state ethical codes.
22. Id. at 491-92. Although Attorney General Thornburgh is facially deferential to state
regulators, the broad definition of federal duties, including both federal law and regulations
adopted by the Attorney General, suggests that the federal government might take a more
assertive role in defining the ethical responsibilities of its lawyers. Id. at 492.
23. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
24. Id. at 490 ("Indeed, the Department has consistently taken the position that the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution does not permit local and state rules to frustrate the lawful
operation of the federal government.").
25. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2086 (arguing that many federal courts
resisted or outright rejected the conclusions of the Thornburgh Memo); Note, Uniform
Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct: A Flawed Proposal, I1I HARv. L. REV. 2063, 2067 (1998)
[hereinafter Note, Uniform Federal Rules] (describing the Thornburgh Memo as
"extraordinarily controversial").
26. See H. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY IN A CHANGING
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: MORE ATTENTION REQUIRED, H.R. REP. No. 101-986, at 32 (1990).
27. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207,
213-14 (2000).
28. See, e.g., Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. io,o86 (Mar. 3, 1994)
(formerly codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.1-12 (1994)).
29. See Bruce A. Green, Federal Prosecutors' Ethics: Who Should Draw the Lines?, 7 PROF. LAW,
Nov. 1995, at 1, 6 ("[T]he regulation expressly forbids state disciplinary authorities and
federal courts from enforcing the rules of ethics insofar as they are more restrictive. Indeed,
it forbids state disciplinary authorities from sanctioning a federal government lawyer for
violating one of the more permissive rules established by the regulation itself, unless and
until the Attorney General finds that the lawyer willfully violated the rule.").
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For example, the regulations restricted the no-contact rule to parties deemed to
have some ability to influence the decisionmaking of an organization.3 o In
substance, the Reno Rule was not a marked departure from the Thornburgh
Memo: both promised compliance with state ethical rules in general but
contemplated a narrow interpretation of those rules to protect federal
interests."1 However, in one respect, the Reno Rule was an unprecedented
expansion of the Department of Justice's role in regulating the conduct of
federal prosecutors. Never before had the Justice Department, or indeed any
body of lawyers, asserted exclusive authority to monitor and regulate any aspect
of the conduct of its attorneys."
Like the Thornburgh Memo, the Reno Rule was strongly resisted by the
courts; the Eighth Circuit went so far as to invalidate the regulations, finding
no statutory basis for a rule exempting federal prosecutors from the local rules
that govern the conduct of all other attorneys appearing before federal courts."
Resistance to the Department of Justice's bold assertions of regulatory
authority in the Thornburgh Memo and the Reno Rule catalyzed the debate on
the appropriate scope of ethical constraints on federal prosecutors and the
appropriate locus of supervisory authority,34 culminating with the passage of
the Citizens Protection Act (also known as the McDade Amendment) in 1998."s
3o. The regulation provides:
A communication with a current employee of an organization that qualifies as a
represented party or represented person shall be considered to be a
communication with the organization for purposes of this part only if the
employee is a controlling individual. A "controlling individual" is a current high
level employee who is known by the government to be participating as a decision
maker in the determination of the organization's legal position in the proceeding
or investigation of the subject matter.
Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. at 10,101.
31. See id. at 1o,o86 ("[F]ederal attorneys generally continue to be subject to state bar ethical
rules where they are licensed to practice, except in the limited circumstances where state
ethical rules clearly conflict with lawful federal procedures and practices."); cf supra notes
22-23 and accompanying text (citing similar language in the Thornburgh Memo).
32. See Green, supra note 29, at 7 ("In promulgating the new federal regulation, the Department
of Justice has asserted an authority it has never previously exercised and that no other body
of lawyers (other than judges) has ever been thought to possess: the exclusive authority to
make and interpret the ethical rules governing certain areas of their own professional
conduct.").
33. See O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1998).
34. See Note, Uniform Federal Rules, supra note 25, at 2067.
3s. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-50, 2681-118 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 5 53oB
(2006)).
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B. The McDade Amendment
In 1992 Congressman Joseph McDade was indicted on five counts,
including "conspiracy, accepting an illegal gratuity by a public official, and
RICO violations," ' stemming from allegations that he had accepted campaign
contributions in return for favorable treatment for government contractors."
Congressman McDade was ultimately acquitted and retained his seat in
Congress. 5 Throughout the investigation and trial, Congressman McDade
complained that the prosecutors in charge of the case exceeded their authority
and engaged in unethical behavior." After the trial, the Congressman
introduced a number of bills designed to rein in prosecutorial excess and clarify
which branch and level of government possessed the ultimate authority to
regulate the conduct of federal prosecutors.4 o After several failed attempts, the
McDade Amendment was finally adopted as a rider to the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for the fiscal
year 199941 over some objections on the Senate floor.42
The McDade Amendment provides that "[a] n attorney for the Government
shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing
attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney's duties, to
the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State."43 At
first glance, the McDade Amendment does not appear to do more than restore
the balance of regulatory authority that existed before the Thornburgh Memo
and Reno Rule. But the text of the statute is susceptible to a number of distinct
interpretations that go further. For instance, the requirement that federal
prosecutors "be subject to State laws and rules" might be interpreted as an
obligation to treat federal prosecutors in the same way as their state
counterparts." A literal interpretation of the phrase "to the same extent and in
36. United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 WL 151314, at * 1 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1992).
37. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 27, at 211.
38. See Veteran Congressman Acquitted in Bribe Case, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1996, at A5.
39. McDade filed a number of motions alleging prosecutorial misconduct, but all were either
dismissed or mooted by his acquittal. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 27, at 212.
40. See H.R. 3396, lo5th Cong. (1998); H.R. 232, io5th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3386, 104th Cong.
(1996).
41. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Star. 2681, 2681-118 to -119 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 5 530B
(20o6)).
42. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. 27,471-72 (1998) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 53oB(a) (2006).
44. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 27, at 216.
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the same manner as other attorneys in that State" may go even further,
requiring that federal prosecutors be subject to the same regulations incumbent
on private attorneys -essentially stripping away any special accommodations
made for prosecutors.4 1
Even under a relatively conservative interpretation of the McDade
Amendment, the law hinders the ability of a federal prosecutor to determine
which ethical regulations govern his conduct. By requiring compliance with the
local rules in each jurisdiction in which he engages in "attorney's duties," the
McDade Amendment potentially introduces a new choice-of-law question. For
federal government lawyers who practice solely within a single jurisdiction, the
provisions of the Amendment would not significantly alter the pre-existing
regulatory landscape.46 However, federal prosecutors frequently investigate
complex cases spanning multiple states and even multiple circuits.47
Consequently, federal prosecutors may find themselves subject to a wide
variety of potentially conflicting ethical codes during the course of a single
investigation."
Along the same lines, federal prosecutors may find themselves subject to
conflicting rules within a jurisdiction under this new regime. The McDade
Amendment expressly holds federal prosecutors subject to the simultaneous
application of state ethical regulations and the local rules adopted by federal
courts. 49 Although these rules are often in substantial alignment,"o federal
courts have vigorously protected their authority to develop unique local rules to
govern the conduct of the attorneys appearing before them." The McDade
Amendment fails to specify whether state or federal regulations control when
they conflict. This uncertainty may have the effect of chilling the exercise of
certain prosecutorial functions as prosecutors make the safe decision to abide
by the most restrictive of potentially applicable regulations."
45. Id.
46. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2092.
47. See McDade Hearing, supra note 5, at 26 (statement of Zachary Carter, United States
Attorney, Eastern District of New York) (claiming that it is the norm, not the exception, for
investigations in the Eastern District of New York to cross jurisdictional boundaries).
48. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2092-93.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 53oB(a) (2006).
50. See infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
51. See infra note 172.
52. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2088-89, 2092.
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II. REFORMING MCDADE
The McDade Amendment has drawn considerable criticism in the years
since its enactment," and there have been legislative and academic proposals to
remedy the considerable regulatory confusion that it has generated. One class
of proposals would generally preserve the primacy of state ethical regulations,
while permitting federal courts to supersede state rules that impinge on a clear
federal interest. A second class of proposals calls for broad unifying ethical
codes such as a national ethical regulation binding on all lawyers or a "Federal
Rules of Ethics" applicable to all lawyers practicing before federal courts.
However, these proposals either fail to achieve the consistent development and
enforcement of ethical rules across jurisdictions or do so only by sacrificing
other important interests, such as preserving state authority over lawyers
appearing before state courts, minimizing the number of ethical standards to
which a single lawyer is subject, or ensuring consistent investigation and
prosecution of federal crimes across the nation.
A. Solutions Prioritizing State Law
There have been at least ten legislative attempts to replace the McDade
Amendment, but none has received significant congressional attention after
introduction.14 Legislative reforms to the McDade Amendment have generally
prioritized resolving the choice-of-law issue by attempting to identify a single
jurisdiction whose rules would apply in a given situation or by encouraging the
harmonization of state and federal rules. Typically, these efforts have also
included explicit acknowledgement of the authority of federal courts to enact
local rules that supersede state ethical rules in conflict with important federal
interests. However, these proposals underserve the unique interests of federal
prosecutors by continuing to subject them to state ethical codes that are
unlikely to be sensitive to the distinct features of the federal criminal
enforcement system.
53. See, e.g., Paula J. Casey, Regulating Federal Prosecutors: Why McDade Should Be Repealed, 19
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 395, 402 (2002) (noting that the McDade Amendment was widely
believed to be an "act of revenge on the part of Congressman McDade"); Gregory B.
LeDonne, Recent Development, Revisiting the McDade Amendment: Finding the Appropriate
Solution for the Federal Government Lawyer, 44 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 231, 234-35 (2007) (noting
considerable academic criticism of McDade).
54. See LeDonne, supra note 53, at 231 & n.5.
154
120:144 2olo
UNIFORM ETHICAL REGULATION OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
The Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act (FPEA),ss proposed by Senator Orrin
Hatch in 1999, would have essentially restored prosecutors to the status quo
ante. The Act would have replaced the section 53oB(a) requirement that
prosecutors comply with the regulations in "each State where such attorney
engages in that attorney's duties"56 with a provision requiring adherence to the
regulations "of the State in which the Federal prosecutor is licensed as an
attorney"" (the "home-state" rule). By preventing the application of multiple
state codes to a single investigation, FPEA resolves the troubling choice-of-law
issues of the McDade Amendment. FPEA also helps to resolve the McDade
Amendment's insensitivity to federal interests and investigation methods by
holding state regulations inapplicable "to the extent that [they are] inconsistent
with Federal law or interfere[] with the effectuation of Federal law or policy,
including the investigation of violations of Federal law."'" The determination
of whether a given state law interfered with "specific Federal duties related to
investigation and prosecution" was to be made by a newly created Commission
on Federal Prosecutorial Conduct." The bill also included a number of specific
ethical rules, generally lifted from existing regulations, statutory prohibitions,
and court decisions, to be enforced by the Attorney General.60 Although the
proposal has received some positive attention in subsequent years," it failed to
advance beyond the Judiciary Committee when it was introduced .
In the same year, Senator Patrick Leahy proposed the Professional
Standards for Government Attorneys Act.' The Act attempted to solve the
choice-of-law dilemma by specifying which body of law applies to a lawyer's
conduct depending on the context in which that conduct takes place. Conduct
"in connection with a proceeding in or before a court" would be governed by
that court's local rules, and conduct "in connection with a pending or
contemplated grand jury proceeding" would be subject to the rules of the court
under whose authority the grand jury is convened.6 4 Other conduct would be
ss. Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act, S. 250, io6th Cong. (1999).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 53oB(a) (20o6).
57. Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act, supra note 55, § 2(a).
ss. Id.
so. Id. § 2(d).
6o. Id. § 2(b).
61. See, e.g., Mick, supra note 13, at 1255 (asserting that adopting the Federal Prosecutor Ethics
Act would be preferable to the McDade regime).
62. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2093.
63. Professional Standards for Government Attorneys Act of 1999, S. 855, io6th Cong. (1999).
64. Id. § 2(a).
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governed by a home-state rule supplemented with provisions to resolve
conflicts where attorneys are licensed in multiple states." Moreover, the Act
expressly urged the Supreme Court to develop a national rule for government
lawyers covering contacts with represented persons and required that the
Judicial Conference develop an advisory report on the matter." At first blush,
this provision appears to do little more than attempt to resolve the controversy
surrounding the no-contact rule. However, it has been suggested that the
provision should be read more broadly, as an encouragement for developing
"uniform ethics rules in areas of particular importance to federal
prosecutors.",6  Senator Leahy's proposal, though it has also attracted some
scholarly support,6 has not received serious legislative attention.
While these legislative efforts were under consideration, the Judicial
Conference of the United States was independently contemplating a response
to the McDade Amendment. The Judicial Conference, which is authorized to
abrogate or modify a federal court's local rules of practice and procedure,6 9 was
primarily concerned with the potential for conflict within jurisdictions - that is,
differences between state ethical codes and the rules adopted by individual
federal district and appellate courts. A proposal put forth by the Judicial
Conference's Subcommittee on Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct would have
automatically aligned the local rules of federal courts and state ethical codes by
requiring federal courts to adopt all state ethical codes and any subsequent
amendments, a process termed "dynamic conformity."7o The process was to be
augmented with a mechanism for the adoption of uniform federal rules that
were to supersede state regulations in areas where the federal interests are
particularly salient.7 ' Although there has been no official adoption of a dynamic
conformity policy, it has achieved some de facto influence.72
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REv.
381, 437 (2002).
68. See, e.g., Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2095-96.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (20o6). The statutory authority for federal courts to adopt local rules of
practice and procedure may be found at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (20o6).
70. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2094-95; see also Andrew L. Kaufman, Lecture,
Who Should Make the Rules Governing Conduct of Lawyers in Federal Matters, 75 TUL. L. REv.
149, 162 (2000).
71. See Kaufman, supra note 70, at 153.
72. See Judith A. McMorrow, The (F) Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court
Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 10 (2005) ("Since 1995, when the issue was framed, federal
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The most troubling aspect of the regulatory environment created by the
McDade Amendment is the statute's apparent insensitivity to whether the
distinctiveness of federal government lawyers might warrant different ethical
rules from those adopted by states to regulate ordinary practitioners. The
aforementioned proposals would alleviate many of the difficulties of the
McDade Amendment by helping to clarify which body of law applies to a given
prosecutorial act while still preserving the primacy of state ethical regulations.
Federal law must be enforced consistently across jurisdictions, 7  and these
proposals explicitly prioritize "[1]ocal control and decentralization.""4
Any interpretation of the McDade Amendment subjects prosecutors in
different jurisdictions to different ethical codes," and there is no reason to
suspect that ethical requirements will be consistent from state to state. Before
the adoption of the Model Rules, legislatures had generally incorporated the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility into state law without significant
change.7' However, the Model Rules, promulgated in 1983, have failed to
achieve universal adoption, and many states have materially altered critical
sections of the Rules when adopting them into law.n As a result, there is
considerable variability among the ethical codes of different jurisdictions.
The proposals surveyed in this Section prevent confusion as to which law
applies to particular conduct, but the use of state ethical regulations to control
the conduct of federal prosecutors preserves disuniformity among jurisdictions.
Federal prosecutors are particularly likely to work in multiple jurisdictions over
courts have moved to embrace dynamic conformity by referring increasingly to the state
Rules of Professional Conduct rather than the Model rules.").
73. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3-4 (1940)
(arguing that the "prestige of federal law" depends on its uniform application); McMorrow,
supra note 72, at 11-13 (noting that federal courts are at least "supposedly uniform" and that
a lack of horizontal uniformity is "anathema to the heart of federal court rule-makers");
Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2097 (identifying an interest in national
uniformity for the federal court system).
74. Kaufman, supra note 70, at 159-62.
75. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
76. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2083.
77. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, too YALE L.J. 1239, 1252 (1991) ("Not
only was the drafting process [of the Model Rules] controversial throughout, the reception of
the Rules by the states was as slow and widely resisted as the reception accorded the Code
had been rapid and widespread."); Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2083.
78. See McMorrow, supra note 72, at 12; Note, Uniform Federal Rules, supra note 25, at 2o65.
However, some commentators have suggested that the variability between the substance of
ethical rules in different jurisdictions is overstated. See Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of
Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be
Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 46o, 524 (1996).
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the course of a single criminal investigation," and subjecting them to different
bodies of ethical regulation based on geographical accident is an unnecessary
complication. This variation actively inhibits the uniform regulation of federal
prosecutors and thereby inhibits the uniform application of federal criminal
law.
For example, Michigan's Rules of Professional Conduct permit contact
with parties represented by a different lawyer that are "authorized by law" ;so
Florida's do not.8' In another striking example, the Supreme Court of Oregon
has interpreted a state ethical rule prohibiting "dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, or false statements" as barring prosecutors from
participating in certain sting operations." Moreover, different states have
adopted materially different rules governing the offering of inducements to
witnesses in exchange for their testimony. Some states have barred any
inducement whatsoever;"3 others have permitted the offer of consideration so
long as it is not otherwise prohibited by law.84
Both the FPEA and the Professional Standards for Government Authority
Act, as well as the system considered by the Judicial Conference, purport to
contain an escape hatch to manage these inconsistencies: provisions
establishing authority of federal bodies to adopt divergent rules in narrow
areas of particular federal concern."' Considering the controversy over the no-
contact rule and the express provision in the Professional Standards for
Government Authority Act encouraging the development of a national
replacement, a national rule governing contact with represented parties is a
likely candidate. However, it is easy to imagine a situation where the need or
propriety of adopting a preemptive federal rule is less clear.
State governments and other state regulators may not be sensitized to the
needs of federal criminal enforcement and may adopt rules that do not account
for the specifics of the federal criminal enforcement system. For example,
federal prosecutors are constitutionally required by the Fifth Amendment to
79. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
8o. See MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1988).
81. See FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002) (including an exception only for notice or
service of process).
82. See In re Gatti, 8 P. 3d 966, 976 (Or. 2000).
83. See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF'I CONDUCT R. 4-3.4 (2002).
84. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2009).
8. See Professional Standards for Government Attorneys Act of 1999, S. 855, io6th Cong.
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86issue indictments through a grand jury. However, prosecutions brought
under Florida state law often can be brought on information supplied by the
prosecutor, without any indictment by a grand jury.7 Consequently, Florida
state prosecutors are authorized to require an individual immediately to come
before the prosecutor to provide information pertinent to an ongoing
88investigation. To prevent the abuse of this power, Florida has adopted strict
ethical rules that would, under the proposals discussed in this Section, become
binding on federal prosecutors as well.8 ' It is unclear that a special preemptive
rule would be warranted to evade the extra restrictions on prosecutorial
conduct spawned by the procedural oddities of a single state.
The inconsistencies between the ethical rules of different states give federal
regulators essentially two options. First, federal regulators could simply
tolerate a certain degree of inconsistency and insensitivity to federal interests -
an unpalatable option. In the alternative, federal bodies must adopt a sweeping
preemptive code, which would replicate my proposal in effect if not in
structure, thus undermining the clear preference for local control that lay
behind the proposals in this Section in the first place.
B. A Uniform National Code for All Lawyers
The impact of the considerable variability among state ethical codes (and
among the interpretations of those codes by regulatory authorities) for all
attorneys has been compounded by the explosion in multi-state and multi-
jurisdiction practice."o Moreover, depending on the nature of the choice-of-law
rules for ethical regulations, it is possible for two lawyers working on the same
matter to be subject to different rules.91 The increasing potential for lawyers or
organizations practicing in multiple jurisdictions to be subject to a confusing
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
87. See FLA. R. CluM. P. 3.140(a) (2) (2002).
88. See McDade Hearing, supra note 5, at 24 (statement of P. Michael Patterson, United States
Attorney, Northern District of Florida).
89. Id.
go. See Note, Uniform Federal Rules, supra note 25, at 2065.
91. See Zacharias, supra note 92, at 346-47. Neither the "home-state" rule of the FPEA nor the
Professional Standards for Government Authority Act completely resolves the issue. In the
first case, it is possible for two prosecutors working on the same matter to be licensed in
different states. In the second case, prosecutors working on the same matter may be
conducting parallel investigations in different jurisdictions, triggering different ethical
regulations under the Professional Standards for Government Authority Act.
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and potentially contradictory array of regulations has prompted a second set of
proposals, calling for a national code of legal ethics."
However, a uniform system of ethical regulation applied to all lawyers at
both the state and federal level is troubling. Submitting all practicing lawyers
to a single ethical code is an overreaction that would limit the ability to develop
suitably nuanced rules for lawyers practicing in different contexts and unduly
undermine the traditional authority of the states to regulate the conduct of
lawyers practicing within their borders. Rational construction of ethical
regulations requires a clear understanding of the features of the legal system in
which the lawyer practices as well as the lawyer's ethical role within that
system.93
The question of the ethical distinction between state and federal
prosecutors, though it has implicitly lurked beneath past debate on the
substance of federal regulations and the appropriate locus of regulatory
authority, has only recently begun to receive scholarly attention.94 There is no
reason to think that the mandate to seek justice, the basic ethical aspiration
from which more detailed ethical regulations for prosecutors are derived,
would apply with either greater or lesser force in the federal context." Abstract
ethical constraints, derived directly from the universal mandate that
prosecutors see that justice is done without reference to a particular
enforcement and prosecution regime - such as a duty for a prosecutor to
prevent the conviction of the innocent as vigorously as he seeks to convict the
92. See Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and
Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 974 (1992) ("[I]t is time to think
seriously of a national bar, governed by uniform federal norms of professional conduct in all
practice contexts. ); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335
(1994).
93. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2089 ("Ethics rules should be thought of as an
'overlay' that can be intelligently written and applied only after consideration of the powers
and responsibilities of the attorneys subject to regulation."). The variation in state ethical
regulations that has emerged since the promulgation of the Model Rules, see supra notes 76-
78 and accompanying text, reinforces the importance of considering both the structure of
the legal system into which those regulations are embedded and the policy considerations
that have driven that system's development. There is no reason to suspect that the
variability in state ethical codes is the result of arbitrary choices or random drift; rather,
there must be structural or policy considerations underlying the decisions to alter the Model
Rules.
94. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 27, at 210 ("The question of whether federal prosecutors
are 'ethically unique' has simmered beneath the surface of the debate about the Department
of Justice's efforts to exempt itself from state codes. But surprisingly, no one has addressed
the conceptual question directly.").
9s. See id. at 238.
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guilty"*-apply equally to federal and state prosecutors.97 These duties are
often as nonspecific as the obligation to do justice itself and offer little concrete
operational guidance.9' But where an ethical obligation arises from the
realization of the demands of justice within the structure of a particular
criminal system or the particular circumstances in which a prosecutor finds
himself, regulators may find that state and federal prosecutors should be
subject to different ethical constraints."
As an example, consider again the extra restrictions that Florida has
adopted to restrain state prosecutors, who are authorized to summon witnesses
to provide information that can form the basis for a prosecution."oo If a
national code were to conform to Florida's regulations, it would unduly burden
federal prosecutors who do not enjoy similarly broad counterbalancing
powers.1 o' On the other hand, if a looser standard were adopted nationally, it
would interfere with Florida's ability to control its own attorneys and might
even require the state to change fundamentally its prosecutorial system to
accommodate laxer rules. In short, a national ethical code for all lawyers would
prove insensitive to the structural considerations that have informed the
divergence between the Model Rules and the diverse ethical regulations that
state governments have actually adopted into law.
Second, the complexity of federal criminal investigations renders a strong
version of the no-contact rule (extending protection to low-level or even
former members of an organization and applying it even to the pretrial
investigatory phase) a more significant burden on federal prosecutors.
Successful prosecution of complex corporate fraud or conspiracy cases may rely
on the ability of prosecutors to interview or solicit the cooperation of members
g6. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
97. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 428 n.178 (noting that federal and state prosecutors
might be subject to similar generalized ethical responsibilities, such as truthfulness before a
tribunal).
98. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 959, 961 (2009) ("[The public interest and justice] are [concepts] so diffuse and elastic
that they do not constrain prosecutors much, certainly not in the way that an identifiable
client would.").
g. See McDade Hearing, supra note 5, at 24 (statement of P. Michael Patterson, United States
Attorney, Northern District of Florida) ("The development of the legal and ethical restraints
on the exercise of prosecutorial authority are inextricably intertwined with the authority and
power granted to the prosecutors within that specific criminal justice system.").
oo. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
io0. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2083-84.
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of these organizations.10 2 Federal prosecutors are also more likely to be
personally involved in the investigation leading up to presentation to a grand
jury and indictment."o3 By contrast, in the typical case, state prosecutors do not
become involved until an arrest has been made and the evidence has been
prepared for presentation to a grand jury.o 4
A restrictive version of the no-contact rule may discourage federal attorneys
from working with law enforcement officers during the course of an
investigation out of concern that they might become involved in a prohibited
contact. This chilling effect could have significant repercussions-both for the
ability of the federal government to investigate complex organizations and for
defendants themselves. Sustained involvement in the investigation from its
preliminary stages allows the prosecutor to become more familiar with the
evidence, improving the odds of successful conviction and allowing more
informed exercises of prosecutorial discretion. Moreover, since prosecutors are
more likely than law enforcement agents to be attuned to the extent and
application of constitutional protections afforded to suspects, overly restrictive
ethical rules relating to pretrial investigation may have the counterintuitive
effect of weakening safeguards for defendants overall.o' The controversy over
the Thornburgh Memo and the Reno Rule makes it clear that state and federal
regulators have taken decidedly different sides on the question of ex parte
102. See McDade Hearing, supra note 5, at 30 (statement of Zachary Carter, United States
Attorney, Eastern District of New York). There is indeed a plausible case to be made that
even Model Rule 4.2 is overbroad and may actually defeat a prosecutor's ethical obligation to
do justice when a party is indirectly represented by counsel retained by his employer. See
Thornburgh Memo, supra note 21, at 489-93. Considering the categories of offense that may
lead to the necessity for contacts with a party who wishes to circumvent corporate counsel-
for example, whistle-blowing- this is likely to arise considerably more frequently for a
federal prosecutor than for a local district attorney. Although ultimately reversed by the
Ninth Circuit, United States v. Talao, No. CR-97-0217-VRW, 1999 WL 33599863 (N.D. Cal.
June 17, 1999), rev'd, 223 F.3 d 1133 (9 th Cir. 2000), demonstrates the potential for broad
prohibitions on ex parte contacts to frustrate federal criminal investigations. In Talao, the
district court found that an ex parte interview with a bookkeeper who claimed she was being
pressured to testify untruthfully violated California Rule of Professional Conduct 2-100
(California's implementation of Model Rule 4.2). Id. at *2-3.
103. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 27, at 237.
104. Id.; see also Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes To Include the
Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 926 (1996) ("State and local
prosecutors generally play a less active role in the investigation stage of the criminal
case....").
ios. See McDade Hearing, supra note 5, at 29 (statement of Zachary Carter, United States
Attorney, Eastern District of New York); Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2091-92.
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contacts with represented parties; it is unlikely that a single national rule for
both state and federal prosecutors could satisfy all parties.
Finally, federal investigations more frequently target complex, multi-
layered organizations than do state prosecutions."o' Federal investigations
routinely handle matters such as multistate terrorism; drug, fraud, or
organized crime conspiracies; fraud against federally funded programs;
violations of civil rights laws; complex corporate crime; and environmental
crime."o7 The successful prosecution of such matters may require the use of
investigative or surveillance techniques rarely required for the typical state
prosecution. For instance, narcotics investigations may hinge on evidence
such as conversations with the target of the investigation recorded by an
undercover investigator-a practice forbidden by the ethical regulations of
some states.'09 Again, regulators devising a national code applicable to all
prosecutors would be faced with the difficult decision of adopting a rule that
hinders the effective enforcement of federal criminal law or a rule that voids the
regulatory choices that states have made for themselves.
There is also an independent value in retaining the ability for state bar
associations and courts to regulate the conduct of lawyers practicing before
state courts. One of the core principles of federalism is the preservation of state
autonomy, such that local institutions reflect local preferences and states may
serve as laboratories for experimentation with different legal regimes.1o While
some have questioned whether or not experimentation actually takes place in
the context of the regulation of professional conduct,"' a momentary lack of
variability is not by itself a sufficient reason to obliterate the potential for the
development of legal diversity. A nationally preemptive code for all lawyers
would render the independent development of ethical regulations all but
impossible.
io6. See DAvIS, supra note 18, at 158; TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw, AM. BAR
Ass'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 48 (1998).
107. 145 CONG. REC. 1027 (1999) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
io8. See McDade Hearing, supra note 5, at 26 (statement of Zachary Carter, United States
Attorney, Eastern District of New York); Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2090 &
nn.8o-8i.
iog. See In re Gatti, 8 P.3 d 966, 976 (Or. 2000) (forbidding prosecutor involvement in sting
operations); McDade Hearing, supra note 5, at 27 (statement of Zachary Carter, United States
Attorney, Eastern District of New York).
na. As Justice Louis Brandeis famously put it: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
im. Burbank, supra note 92, at 974. But see supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
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III.THE CASE FOR A NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ETHICAL REGULATION
FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
The McDade Amendment is premised on two key assumptions: first,
federal prosecutors should be treated more like their state counterparts and,
second, the ethical role of prosecutors is not substantially different from that of
an ordinary advocate.1 12 Each of the proposals discussed in the previous Part
subscribes to at least one of McDade's fundamental precepts. This Note rejects
both. Prosecutors occupy a unique position in the legal system, and the
substance of the ethical rules binding lawyers is necessarily dependent on both
the features of that system and the lawyer's place within it."' It is therefore
more appropriate to codify ethical regulations for prosecutors separately than
to create special exceptions to a generalized ethical code.114 Moreover, state and
federal prosecutors practice in fundamentally different environments,
suggesting the need for an ethical code that takes explicit account of the needs
of federal prosecutors.
Some commentators have offered a somewhat more muted proposal than a
nationally preemptive code for all lawyers. They have advocated a "Federal
Rules of Ethics" governing only lawyers appearing before federal courts,
analogous to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or Rules of Evidence."' Limiting the scope of a uniform federal
code to federal courts would solve the most pressing problem with
nationalizing the regulation of legal ethics by obviating the need for difficult
considerations concerning whether existing state rules are adequate or new
rules, sensitive to the needs of federal criminal enforcement, should be
extended to all prosecutors. Moreover, it would preserve the authority of states
to regulate the conduct of attorneys practicing before state courts.
However, while addressing many of the concerns discussed above, the
proposal is not without its own drawbacks. The creation of preemptive ethics
112. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 27, at 216-22.
113. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
114. Other commentators have also suggested the possibility of separate codification for rules
regulating prosecutors. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 18, at 161; Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial
Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1573, 1604. However, these suggestions have generally
been vague and precatory. This Note, on the other hand, makes the case for a preemptive
national collection of regulations limited solely to federal prosecutors.
115. See, e.g., LeDonne, supra note 53, at 242; Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2o5o: A Look
Back, 6o FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127-28 (1991) (hypothesizing a future in which the ethical
regulation of lawyers is carried out by a national disciplinary board). A similar proposal was
briefly considered by the Judicial Conference, but "it quickly stalled as overkill."
McMorrow, supra note 72, at 17.
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rules for federal courts would prioritize uniformity across all federal courts at
the expense of uniformity among all courts within the same jurisdiction.",6
That is, uniform rules for federal courts would resolve confusion regarding the
appropriate ethical standards for lawyers practicing exclusively before federal
courts-such as federal prosecutors-at the expense of lawyers who appear
before both state and federal courts. It is less than clear that the benefits of
simplifying the practice of federal government lawyers would outweigh the
additional complications that a new set of ethical regulations would impose on
other lawyers.
Although it may be undesirable to subject all lawyers - or even all lawyers
appearing before federal courts - to a single national code of legal ethics, a
coherent system of national regulation designed specifically to guide the
discretion of federal prosecutors may prove desirable. A uniform system of
ethical regulation solely for federal prosecutors would allow consistent
regulation of the behavior of federal prosecutors (and thereby make the
enforcement of criminal law more consistent as well) without unduly
disturbing other normative goals. Preemptive rules narrowly focused on federal
prosecutors would preserve the states' interest in regulating attorneys who may
practice before state courts and would avoid increasing the number of
regulatory frameworks to which other lawyers are subject.
Much of the commentary on the ethical regulation of prosecutors appears
to be premised on the assumption that a prosecutor should, in general, be
treated similarly to any other lawyer in an adversarial proceeding.
Consequentially, the discussion on the ethical obligations of prosecutors has
generally focused on defining special powers and limitations of the
prosecutorial role and on determining how ethical codes should be modified to
accommodate them."' This suggests the existence of a default set of rules
common to all lawyers from which regulators should carve out exceptions and
build in additional restrictions for prosecutors. There is no reason why this
must be the case. Prosecutors are not ordinary lawyers, and attempts to
conceptualize their ethical responsibilities - and, implicitly, solutions to their
ethical lapses -within the comfortable framework of an adversarial proceeding
116. See Zacharias, supra note 92, at 370.
117. See, e.g., Green, supra note 114, at 1573-74 (noting that the work of prosecutors differs from
that of others lawyers and suggesting that the Model Rules might need to be made more
restrictive in certain areas and less restrictive in others as a consequence); Note, Federal
Prosecutors, supra note 12, at 2095-96 (advocating regulation of federal prosecutors that
would essentially track state law, which universally subjects prosecutors to generalized
ethical standards containing minor exceptions and additions related to prosecutorial
conduct).
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between zealous advocates, undoubtedly the foundation of the Model Rules and
the state ethical codes derived from them, disserve prosecutors' distinct ethical
role.
The role of a prosecutor is unique within the American legal system."'
Rather than representing an individual client, the prosecutor acts as a
representative of the state "whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.""' This observation has been condensed into a longstanding overarching
ethical mandate common to all prosecutors: the exhortation to "do justice."120
That the prosecutorial role is not simply to advocate zealously the state's case,
but rather to serve the interests of justice has long been recognized by the
judiciary,"' the legal academy,' and practicing lawyers.'23 Given the clear
difference in role between a prosecutor and an advocate for a private client, the
seeming reluctance to consider the role of prosecutors as unique for the
purpose of ethical regulation is puzzling. A separate regulatory system would
allow more careful consideration of the interests of prosecutors as set against
118. See Green, supra note 15, at 71 ("The interests and experiences of prosecutors are in many
respects unique and, as a consequence, prosecutors frequently view the propriety of their
own behavior differently from others within the organized bar including, but not limited to,
criminal defense attorneys.").
119. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S 78, 88 (1935). Berger has been described as the "locus
classicus for discussion of the extraordinary duties of a prosecutor." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 760 (1986).
120. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
612 (1999) (characterizing the "duty to seek justice" as the traditional source of the
prosecutorial ethos).
121. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481 (D.C. Cit. 1967) ("An attorney for the
United States, as any other attorney, however, appears in a dual role. He is at once an officer
of the court and the agent and attorney for a client . . . ."). Professor Green has identified a
number of early cases in California and Michigan characterizing the prosecutor's role as
'quasi-judicial." See Green, supra note 120, at 613-14 nn.17-18.
122. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference,
44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958) ("[A] prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the conduct of his
office the standards of an attorney appearing on behalf of an individual client. The freedom
elsewhere wisely granted to partisan advocacy must be severely curtailed if the prosecutor's
duties are to be properly discharged."). But see JOHN W. SUTHERS, No HIGHER CALLING, No
GREATER RESPONSIBILITY: A PROSECUTOR MAKES His CASE 70 (2008) (characterizing
prosecutors as advocates and contrasting their role with that of a judge as an independent,
"1neutral arbiter of the law").
123. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2010) ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.").
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the need to constrain the application of their discretion, which may be
underserved in the development of generalized ethical rules.' 4
Institutional differences between state and federal prosecutors may also
counsel separate codification. First, while state prosecutors are generally
elected,' U.S. Attorneys are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the
President. 26 Because of their location in a centralized hierarchy within the
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorneys have an occupational ethical
responsibility to carry out the directives of a superior that is not incumbent on
directly elected prosecutors. 2 7 In particular, federal prosecutors are bound to
follow the prescriptions of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual as well as the orders of
the Attorney General."' Prosecutorial misconduct is generally considered to
stem from an overabundance of discretionary authority,"' and ethical
regulations are intended to circumscribe that discretion. The diffuse political
accountability of elected state prosecutors has not served as an adequate check
on abuses of prosecutorial discretion.1o It may be the case that direct
accountability to a specific principal officer allows more narrowly tailored and
immediate responses to ethical lapses. Consequently, the need to impose
124. See, e.g., McDade Hearing, supra note 5, at 73 (statement of John Smietanka, Former
Principal Assoc. Deputy Att'y Gen.) ("[At] the level of the rulemaking committees ... there
is no one who is representing the prosecutorial point of view."). The problem is
compounded by the lobbying strength of the private bar. See, e.g., infra note 158 and
accompanying text (describing a concerted lobbying effort by the white-collar defense bar to
overturn a DOJ policy concerning conditions on offers of leniency to corporate officers).
125. As of 2007, only four states (Delaware, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Connecticut) retain a
system of appointed prosecutors. The remaining forty-six states provide for the direct
election of state prosecutors. See DAVIS, supra note 18, at io-ii.
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 541 (2006). Assistant U.S. Attorneys are directly appointed by the Attorney
General and subject to removal by him. See 28 U.S.C. § 542 (20o6).
127. See SUTHERS, supra note 122, at 114 (noting that state district attorneys and attorneys general
in most states "have no supervisors and are ultimately only accountable to the people who
elected them").
128. DAvIS, supra note 18, at 158; see also SUTHERS, supra note 122, at 112 (noting that while
federal prosecutors were originally intended to wield a certain degree of independent
discretion, they are increasingly subjected to "various prosecution and crime-prevention
initiatives . . . that leave little room for the exercise of discretion"). For example, following
the attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. Attorneys were directed to make the investigation
and prosecution of terrorism their highest priority. See id. at 111. But see Bruce A. Green &
Fred C. Zacharias, "The U.S. Attorneys Scandal" and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 214-15 (2008) (discussing the limits of the authority of the Attorney
General to direct the behavior of federal prosecutors).
129. Green & Zacharias, supra note 128, at 189.
130. See DAVIS, supra note 18, at 11-12.
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external restrictions on ethical decisionmaking may be somewhat lessened for
federal prosecutors.
On the other hand, it is easy to imagine situations in which there is a clear
tension between a federal prosecutor's independent judgment of what justice
requires and his or her ethical responsibility to effectuate the policies and
instructions of principal officers."' For example, the Attorney General may
direct federal prosecutors to refrain from offering defendants more lenient
treatment than the law requires. Is the prosecutor ethically bound to obey the
directive?"' Although the degree to which political principals should be able to
direct the actions of federal prosecutors is a matter of policy,"' it is imperative
that ethical rules for federal prosecutors be sensitive to the organizational
structure of the Department of Justice - a consideration unlikely to weigh
heavily in debates at the state level.
Second, defendants in federal cases are often far better equipped to mount
a competent defense. Federal defendants are more often able to afford their
own private counsel, and even those who cannot are provided federal defenders
who are, as a general matter, abler and better funded than state public
defenders.13 4 Consequently, the need for ethical rules intended to mitigate the
resource and information asymmetries between the prosecutors and defense
131. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 128, at 197 (noting that the Attorney General, who directly
supervises U.S. Attorneys, "is subject to different kinds of political pressures" from those
facing federal prosecutors).
132. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2006); Green & Zacharias, supra note 128, at 214-15.
133. Compare Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 921 (2009) (advocating "structural reforms" to
"allow political actors to control their agents"), with Jackson, supra note 73, at 3-4 ("[The
federal prosecutor's] responsibility . . . for law enforcement and for its methods cannot be
wholly surrendered to Washington, and ought not to be assumed by a centralized
Department of Justice. . . . [I]t is an unusual case in which his judgment should be
overruled. . . . At the same time we must proceed in all districts with that uniformity of
policy which is necessary to the prestige of federal law."), and Daniel C. Richman, Federal
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757,
789-91 (1999) (noting a congressional interest in regional variability in prosecutorial
policies).
134. See Justin F. Marceau, Un-Incorporating the Bill of Rights: The Tension Between the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Federalism Concerns That Underlie Modern Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1231, 1261 (2008) ("It is widely known that the resources
available to lawyers representing indigent defendants in the federal court system are, in
many instances, vastly superior to what is available to indigent defendants in the state
system."); Marc Sackin, Note, Applying United States v. Stein to New York's Indigent Defense
Crisis: Show the Poor Some Love Too, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 299, 330 n.188 (2007) ("[F]ederal
defenders . . . have lighter case loads and greater resources, and [have greater] opportunity
to investigate . . . than their state public defender counterparts.").
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counsel is less pressing in the context of federal prosecutions. For instance,
prophylactic disclosure rules requiring that prosecutors identify all exculpatory
evidence and disclose it to defense attorneys on their own initiative- common
in state ethical codes -may be an undue burden on prosecutors in complex
federal criminal prosecutions and unnecessary for the defense."'
The rift between the state and federal criminal systems is further
exemplified by differing rules on the offering of inducements. In United States
v. Singleton, the Tenth Circuit vacated a conviction after finding that the
prosecutor had violated a federal law prohibiting offering anything of value to
a witness for his testimony."' In dicta, the court noted that the witness
inducement likely also violated Kansas Rule ofProfessional Conduct 3.4 (b), which
prohibits offering "unlawful inducements" in order to secure witness
testimony."' The commentary to Rule 3.4 (b), which had been incorporated by
the Kansas Supreme Court, provides that "[t]he [Kansas] common law
rule . . . is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for
11138testifying ....
The decision was reversed on a en banc rehearing by the Tenth Circuit,
which held that the federal prohibition on offering inducements could not
stand as it interfered unreasonably with the effective execution of the duties of
federal prosecutors.13 ' The difficulty of obtaining evidence in a complex
criminal case, a far more common scenario in federal criminal enforcement,
militates against the prohibition on offering inducements to witnesses for
testimony.14 o Although the conflict between state and federal regulation was
not discussed by the majority as the decision was rendered before the McDade
Amendment took effect,14' Singleton is illustrative of the potential for state
ethical regulations to conflict materially with the balance struck, at the federal
level, between the government's interest in punishing crime and in restraining
unethical conduct by prosecutors. A national system of ethical regulation
limited to federal prosecutors would serve the need for federal prosecutors to
135. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 427.
136. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F-3d 1343, 1358-59 (loth Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3 d
1297 (loth Cir. 1999).
137. 144 F.3 d at 1344.
138. Id. at 1359 (citing KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3 .4 (b) cmt. (1997)).
139. See 165 F-3d 1297, 1302.
140. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 27, at 238.
141. However, a dissenting opinion reiterates the common law interpretation of "illegal
inducements" as adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court, noting that the McDade
Amendment (which was not yet in force) clearly signaled congressional intent that federal
prosecutors be held to state ethical standards. 165 F.3d at 1313-14 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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gather evidence while preserving longstanding state ethical codes and
interpretations in state prosecutions.
Concerns about the relative benefits of state-federal uniformity within a
jurisdiction-as opposed to uniformity across all federal courts 2 - do not
directly apply to a uniform code solely for federal prosecutors. Although some
commentators have noted that it would be problematic, in general, to subject
different lawyers in the same action to different ethical rules, 4 the concern
does not apply with full force in criminal prosecutions. While opposing
advocates in a civil action occupy essentially the same role, a prosecutor and a
defense attorney can hardly be imagined as similarly situated, limiting the
justification for ensuring that they conform to the same ethical standards.
Moreover, prosecutors and defense attorneys are already subject to different
codes of conduct both because of existing special accommodations for and
restrictions on prosecutors, such as Model Rule 3.8,' and because of
constitutional constraints on prosecutorial discretion.
Even were the relative merits of horizontal and vertical uniformity
determinative, the balance tips in favor of consistency across federal courts.
The need for consistent interpretation and application of federal law is
particularly pressing in the context of criminal law, which implicates society's
most severe sanctions and engages the public interest in justice far more than
ordinary civil suits do. Criminal sanctions are a form of moral reprobation and
may implicate a defendant's liberty, as well as his property. Since federal
prosecutors appear exclusively before federal courts,'4 1 the creation of a
national code of legal ethics for federal prosecutors allows the government
interest in uniform administration of federal law to be satisfied without
disturbing the existing regulatory regime for any other group of lawyers.
Note, however, that separate rules for federal prosecutors may indirectly
increase the regulatory confusion for defense attorneys who practice before
142. See Green, supra note 78, at 526-27 & n.333.
143. See Kaufman, supra note 70, at 161-62 ("One problem with crafting rules for federal
government lawyers, however, is that their work very often is performed in a context where
there is a private lawyer adversary. To avoid the problem of having different professional
rules apply to lawyers in a single transaction or litigation, federal professional rules would
have to govern private lawyers too, thus imposing on private lawyers the potential of having
two different sets of professional rules apply simultaneously in matters with state and
federal ramifications."). Professor Kaufman's concern is somewhat blunted in the criminal
context, where prosecutors and defense attorneys serve fundamentally different roles and,
consequently, are already subject to disparate ethical regulations.
144. Model Rule 3.8 contains special provisions governing the prosecutorial function. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2010).
145. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 27, at 242.
170
120:144 2010
UNIFORM ETHICAL REGULATION OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
both state and federal courts. In jurisdictions where federal courts have
adopted state ethical codes as local rules, these attorneys might find themselves
litigating against prosecutors subject to different ethical regulations.
Consequently these attorneys may benefit from additional protections in state
courts - such as prophylactic mandates for prosecutors to supply the defense
with information or prohibitions on certain investigatory techniques.4' This
concern is ultimately unpersuasive: where state codes and federal court local
rules differ, defense attorneys are already subject to this disparity.
A national code tailored specifically to federal prosecutors would allow
regulators to take the distinct interests of federal prosecutors into account
without directly disturbing the ethical regulation of other classes of lawyers.
Further, it would help to ensure consistent criminal enforcement across
jurisdictions. The following Part will explore considerations as to where the
authority to develop and enforce national ethical regulations for federal
prosecutors should be lodged.
IV. FRAGMENTING REGULATORY AUTHORITY
The introduction of a national standard governing the ethical conduct of
federal prosecutors necessitates a reexamination of the disciplinary institutions
to which they are currently subject. It seems axiomatic that complete
uniformity of regulation requires both a single set of rules and a single
institution responsible for their interpretation and application.14 ' This suggests
two related questions: who should be responsible for drafting and updating a
national ethical code for federal prosecutors and who would be responsible for
enforcing it? Although it would help to ensure alignment between the
overriding purpose of ethical rules and their application, there is no reason that
the institution that develops the rules needs to be responsible for
enforcement. '18 This Part will consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of
various potential regulators -including the federal courts, Congress, and the
Department of Justice-with respect to their capacity both for developing a
robust system of ethical regulation and for enforcing it. Ultimately, it is clear
that regulatory authority over federal prosecutors must be fragmented. For
reasons of consistency, this allocation of authority must minimize the potential
overlap of rulemaking and enforcement responsibilities.
146. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
147. See Green, supra note 78, at 525-26.
148. See Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics ofFederal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv.
355, 414 (1996).
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The division of authority suggested in this Part is not the only possible one
and may not even be the best from a normative standpoint. The purpose of this
Part is rather to demonstrate that it is possible for a national code of ethics for
federal prosecutors to be developed so as to minimize the overlap of authority
between regulators and account for their peculiar strengths and weaknesses.
Consequently, this discussion elides, to some extent, the considerable political
and administrative difficulties that would accompany transitioning to a
federalized system for regulating federal prosecutors. Rather than focusing on
implementation specifics, this Part undertakes a broad discussion of the
strengths and weaknesses of potential regulators and attempts to locate at least
a plausible dividing line between the authority of each to make and enforce
regulations governing prosecutorial conduct.
A. Who Makes the Rules?
Consistent ethical regulation requires that each aspect of a prosecutor's
conduct be regulated by only one authority and that those regulations be
enforced by only one authority. However, the creation and enforcement of
rules have always been divided among multiple authorities: federal prosecutors
might find themselves subject to disciplinary action by their departmental
superiors, federal courts, or state bar associations.'4 9 Worse, the current
regulatory framework admits considerable overlap amongst regulators. It is not
uncommon for a prosecutor's conduct to be examined by a court and then have
the issue referred to a separate disciplinary board, such as a state bar
association or the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR).so Though
other commentators have been wary of attempting to define bright-line rules
for determining when federal prosecutors should be disciplined by federal
courts, the Department of Justice, or by Congress,"' the consistent application
of ethical rules to federal prosecutors demands just such a division. A national
code premised on ensuring uniform application and interpretation must
include clear rules for which regulatory authority has preemptive (or exclusive)
authority in any given situation.
149. See McDade Hearing, supra note 5, at 60-63 (statement of Richard L. Delonis, President,
National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys).
150. See, e.g., Green, supra note 15, at 86-87 (discussing the disciplinary action taken against the
prosecutor in United States v. Isgro, 751 F. Supp. 846 (C.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 974 F.2d lo91
(9 th Cit. 1992), who was subject to both a public sanction by the judiciary and an internal
investigation by the OPR).
151. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 386.
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The most straightforward solution would be for Congress to intervene and
craft a body of substantive ethical regulations for federal prosecutors or issue
guidelines to another regulator, such as the Attorney General.' Congress has
the constitutional authority to issue broad national regulations with
preemptive effect, which would do much to ensure national uniformity."'
However, to date Congress has rarely exercised its authority to regulate directly
the conduct of federal prosecutors in a meaningful way.15 4
Even if Congress were to take a more active role in shaping a national
ethical code, it is not institutionally suited to the task. First, the proper
construction of ethical rules is critically dependent on a clear understanding of
the appropriate balance between the needs of federal law enforcement officials
and the rights of defendants and targets of federal investigations.' Although
Congress is a deliberative body and has superior access to expert testimony,', 6
it may not have the professional judgment necessary to make a reasoned
decision.' Practicing prosecutors and those who interact with them regularly,
such as judges or other DOJ attorneys, are in a considerably better position to
accurately predict the impact of a given ethical provision. Second, Congress, as
a political body, has a tendency to be a reactive rather than a prospective
regulator. The McDade Amendment itself is a primary example of this type of
behavior: surely the conditions that ostensibly justified the enactment existed
prior to Congressman McDade's prosecution, but it was not until a high-
profile incident that Congress was moved to act. Finally, Congress is
particularly susceptible to the efforts of organized lobbying groups,"' which
may exacerbate the existing problem of defense bar influence over the ethical
152. The Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act takes this approach: outlining nine specific behaviors that
the Attorney General was bound to prohibit when developing a more detailed regulatory
regime. Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act, S. 250, io6th Cong. § b(s) ('999).
153. See Mick, supra note 13, at 1290-91.
154. See Barkow, supra note 133, at 917.
155. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
156. See Mick, supra note 13, at 1290-91.
157. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 437-38 ("[I]t is doubtful that Congress can helpfully
specify the substantive criteria the rulemakers should employ. The considerations bearing
on whether to adhere to, or depart from, states rules simply are too multifaceted .... ). It
follows that Congress would be even more unhelpful in devising the actual content of the
rules.
158. See Zacharias, supra note 92, at 393-99 (noting that Congress may find it particularly
difficult to craft an "intelligent legislative product" in the face of organized interest groups
challenging the somewhat speculative predictions of potential regulatory effects made by
academics and prosecutorial agencies).
173
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
rules governing prosecutorial conduct.'" Instead, it would be preferable for
Congress to delegate as much rulemaking authority as possible to allow actors
with a better understanding of the complexities of federal criminal prosecution
to determine whether and how rules for federal prosecutors should differ from
existing state codes.
The candidate with the strongest claim to expertise in the intricacies of
federal prosecution is the Department of Justice itself. There are certainly
benefits to developing an ethical code via administrative rulemaking overseen
by the Department of Justice. Given both the flexibility and broad solicitation
of stakeholder input typical of administrative rulemaking, as well as the
Department of Justice's considerable experience with federal criminal
enforcement, such a code is likely to be highly detailedso and to take account of
the unique requirements of prosecuting federal crimes.
Concerns about objectivity and political susceptibility, however, make the
Department of Justice an unpalatable choice to draft a code of ethics for federal
prosecutors. Certainly the Department of Justice may make regulations
governing the conduct of its employees, including federal prosecutors, through
the normal administrative notice-and-comment process.'6 Thus far, this
authority has generally been applied only to fill gaps in the local rules adopted
by federal courts or state regulatory regimes,6' and the Department of Justice
should avoid the temptation to use it to regulate broadly, as some scholars have
suggested.' The Department of Justice may have some difficulty crafting
unbiased ethical regulations164 and may be particularly prone to err in
regulating aspects of prosecutorial conduct that other regulators may not be
able to observe or easily sanction. This is not simply a hypothetical concern.
Regardless of one's own opinion of the propriety of exempting federal
prosecutors from the no-contact rule, the battle over regulatory supremacy
sparked by the Thornburgh Memo and Reno Rule demonstrates that other
potential regulators have concerns as to the Department of Justice's objectivity
and the scope of its regulatory authority.
159. The influence of the defense bar is well illustrated by the battle over the Thompson Memo.
See infra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
16o. See Green, supra note 78, at 470.
161. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
162. See Green, supra note 78, at 469.
163. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 53, at 424.
164. See Green, supra note 29, at 7-8 ("One might question the Department's objectivity. How
can prosecutors, engaged in the competitive enterprise of gathering incriminating evidence,
objectively determine how much weight to give the respective interests of the government
and the individual and how the balance should be struck?").
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Moreover, the political accountability of the Attorney General may interfere
with the ability of the Department of Justice adequately to protect prosecutorial
interests in the face of concerted lobbying by private bars. For example, in
2003, the Department of Justice implemented the Thompson Memo, which,
among other things, provided incentives for corporations to waive attorney-
client privilege to aid in the identification of individual wrongdoers. 6,
Following concerted campaigning by the white-collar defense bar and the
introduction of overriding legislation by Senator Arlen Specter, the
Department soon changed its position, issuing a blanket proscription on
i 66
considering a corporation's agreement to a waiver.
It is important to note that the Department of Justice, notwithstanding the
clear potential for actual or perceived bias, cannot reasonably be denied the
authority to promulgate its own internal ethical rules and discipline
prosecutors for violations of either internal or external rules. Such an
arrangement would prove an unjustifiable violation of the Department's
autonomy and ability effectively to carry out the prosecution of federal crimes.
To be sure, the Department of Justice, as the employer of federal prosecutors,
must maintain some form of internal disciplinary process. This suggests that
any regulatory system for federal prosecutors must contain some provision for
restraining the Department of Justice's internal authority to set its own
overriding policies. The simplest solution is to permit the Department of
Justice to place additional restrictions on the conduct of its attorneys but
withhold the authority to enact regulations, such as the Reno Rule, that loosen
or abrogate any externally imposed ethical limitation.
The federal courts are another potential body to which Congress might
delegate regulatory authority. Federal courts are granted the authority to adopt
local rules regulating the conduct of attorneys who appear before them by
virtue of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83.167 Accordingly, federal courts
could adopt collectively (or the Supreme Court could impose) a uniform set of
local court rules governing the ethical conduct of federal prosecutors."' In
1995, the Judicial Conference considered recommending a national code for all
attorneys appearing before federal courts but rejected the proposal as an
165. See Barkow, supra note 133, at 918.
166. Id. at 918-19.
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1).
168. Burbank, supra note 92, at 973 ("Imported disuniformity is a self-inflicted wound; the
federal courts have chosen to borrow and to do so on a decentralized basis. Surely, the
federal judiciary has the means to solve the problem, one way or another, by requiring
federal uniformity.").
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overreaction to the regulatory disharmony among federal courts."' A narrower
code that focused solely on federal prosecutors would not implicate the state's
authority to regulate lawyers who appear before state courts and so may prove
more palatable.
However, there is good reason to suspect that federal courts will prove
reluctant regulators in this area. First, owing perhaps to the traditional
supremacy of state authority to license lawyers (and therefore to regulate the
conduct of practicing attorneys),"o many district courts have instead directly
adopted state ethical codes as their local rules,17 ' even though they are under no
obligation to do so."' Second, federal courts have traditionally been wary of
intervening in the regulation of criminal prosecution, which is generally viewed
as a core executive function.7 7 This concern is unpersuasive for two reasons: as
a historical matter, the prosecutorial role cannot be said to be a solely executive
function;77 and the separation of powers among the branches of the federal
government is not, and should not be, absolute."17  Regardless of these
critiques, separation-of-powers principles have often rendered courts unwilling
to police the conduct of prosecutors aggressively without a clear delegation of
authority.17 While narrowing the scope of a national code to only federal
169. See McMorrow, supra note 72, at 17.
170. See id. at 9 ("States are the initial source of the right to practice law. This first order power
gives state supreme courts, and the courts who report to them, a strong and powerful role
among the multiple institutions that shape the legal profession.") (citation omitted).
171. Note, Uniform Federal Rules, supra note 25, at 2066-67.
172. See Green, supra note 15, at 74. Indeed, federal courts have aggressively protected their
authority to set their own rules distinct from those adopted by the state. Professor Zacharias
has identified a number of cases in which federal courts have explicitly noted that their own
ethical regulations control. Zacharias, supra note 92, at 340 n.24.
173. Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that, under a strict view of separation-of-
powers principles, any judicial regulation of prosecutors may be unconstitutional. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 119, at 3o; Edward C. Carter III, Limits of Judicial Pover: Does the
Constitution Bar the Application of Some Ethics Rules to Executive Branch Attorneys?, 27 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 295, 309-10 (2003) (arguing that Model Rules 3 .8(f), 4.2, and 8.4(c) cannot be applied
to federal prosecutors without violating separation-of-powers principles). But see Krent,
supra note 17, at 312 ("Such enhanced executive control may represent sound policy
grounded in concern for both effective and fair criminal law enforcement. But sage policy
should not be confused with constitutional mandate.").
174. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
175. See Krent, supra note 17, at 282.
176. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("The remedy [for
prosecutorial misconduct] lies ultimately within the establishment where power and
discretion reside. The President has abundant supervisory and disciplinary powers-
including summary dismissal-to deal with misconduct of his subordinates; it is not the
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prosecutors or an express mandate from Congress in the form of an
amendment to the Rules Enabling Act"' may encourage the federal courts to
take a more aggressive stance,17 it would be preferable to entrust the
development of a detailed code to a less wary entity.
In addition to their direct rulemaking authority, federal courts also have a
parallel, independent source of authority to control the conduct of federal
prosecutors: the supervisory powers doctrine, which permits individual courts
to regulate the administration of the criminal system.'79  In principle,
decentralized judicial regulation may permit more "textured" development of
ethical regulations than is possible when a complete code is developed through
the consensus of a wide variety of interest groups, as would be the case in
administrative rulemakings or codes developed by the Judicial Conference.so
However, supervisory authority is limited by the "harmless error" doctrine,
which limits courts under their supervisory authority to offering remedies for
prosecutorial misconduct only for those ethical lapses that are clearly
prejudicial to the defendant.' This rule therefore similarly limits the ability of
courts to develop nuanced distinctions between ethical and unethical behavior.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has intimated that the supervisory powers
doctrine may apply only to the conduct of prosecutors before courts.
function of the judiciary to review the exercise of executive discretion whether it be that of
the President himself or those to whom he has delegated certain of his powers.") (citation
omitted).
177, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (20o6).
s78. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 452 (suggesting that congressional encouragement
may help courts focus on the merits of ethics regulation).
179. Although the existence of the supervisory powers doctrine has been questioned in the past,
most commentators today accept it and instead question its scope. See Fred C. Zacharias &
Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority To Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory,
56 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1310-11 (2003).
180. See ABRAH-AM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE
GUILTY PLEA 67 (1981) (suggesting that judicial review of guilty pleas will lead to "a textured
common law of prosecutorial authority").
181. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 5o6 (1983) ("Supervisory power to reverse a
conviction is not needed as a remedy when the error to which it is addressed is harmless
since, by definition, the conviction would have been obtained notwithstanding the asserted
error.").
182. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 27, at 242; see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,
607 (1985) (suggesting that judicial review of charging decisions was inappropriate both
because "factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the
Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's
overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake" and because routine judicial review of charging decisions may
"chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to
177
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
One potential solution is for Congress to fragment rulemaking and primary
enforcement authority along this line suggested by the supervisory powers
doctrine by explicitly reserving to the federal courts authority to promulgate
rules and standards regulating certain, specified aspects of the prosecutorial
function that had potentially invoked the courts' supervisory authority.
Conduct that cannot trigger the invocation of a court's supervisory powers
should be regulated by an independent commission of the sort contemplated in
an early draft of the McDade Amendment" or the FPEA.'84 Such a body
would retain the deliberative and information-gathering strengths of Congress
but would be somewhat more isolated from political interference. Along the
same lines, the commission must remain independent of the Department of
Justice to prevent the appearance of bias. An administrative commission whose
members have prosecutorial or law enforcement experience would be well
situated to address issues outside the competence of the federal courts, such as
investigatory behavior or the ethical application of charging discretion.
B. Investigation and Enforcement
The proper allocation of authority to ensure consistent enforcement of a
national code is less clear. It has been suggested that an overabundance of
disciplinary authorities may contribute to the underenforcement of ethical
regulations as each actor assumes that another will take primary
responsibility,' but it is clear that no single authority is capable of assuming
sole responsibility for overseeing the behavior of federal prosecutors.
Accordingly, the ultimate goal should be a cooperative joint venture designed
to minimize conflict among regulators. 86 It is critical, however, that
cooperation not imply duplication of enforcement authority. Enforcement
authority may be split into investigative and sanction-issuing functions, and
these may be divided among potential regulators to ensure that the most
capable body has primary authority at each stage of the disciplinary process.
A uniform national system of regulation for federal prosecutors can be
created only by a federal agency, but the authority to enforce the code and
discipline lawyers for violations might well be left to the existing system of
outside inquiry"); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (noting that the
enforcement of criminal law is an activity primarily entrusted to the executive branch and
warning lower courts to tread lightly in regulating law enforcement activities).
183. See Citizens Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 3396, 1o5th Cong. § 203 (1998).
184. See Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act, S. 250, 1o6th Cong. (1999).
185. See, e.g., Green, supra note 15, at 91.
186. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 387 n.8 (citing Kaufman, supra note 70, at 164).
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state disciplinary boards. State enforcement would be minimally disruptive to
the existing disciplinary framework and would help to mitigate perceptions of
self-dealing by federal agencies and organizations.' 7 However, the degree to
which state boards are actually willing to engage in disciplinary actions against
federal prosecutors is a matter of some debate.' 8 Moreover, the referral of
federal prosecutors to state disciplinary boards for ethical violations may
undercut the development of national uniformity that was the impetus for a
national standard in the first place. Even if a uniform set of rules and standards
is adopted, each state would still be free to pursue its own enforcement
strategy, potentially leading to a de facto balkanization of ethical rules akin to
the situation currently facing federal prosecutors. 9
State disciplinary boards also may be unable to issue suitably targeted
sanctions. Although the secrecy of disciplinary boards makes it difficult to
ascertain the scope of punitive sanctions that they have issued,' the options
appear to be limited. A prosecutor found to have violated state ethical
standards might be publicly or privately reprimanded, suspended, or even
disbarred."' A public reprimand, though surely damaging to a prosecutor's
reputation, is ultimately a fairly mild sanction. On the other hand,
suspension or disbarment is a severe punishment, suited only to the most
serious of ethical lapses. The lack of a clear middle ground may render state
authorities unable to deter prosecutorial misconduct that cannot be effectively
controlled by reprimand or fines but does not warrant suspension. In sum,
bolting the existing state disciplinary system onto a new federalized regime
would likely continue the existing disharmony between jurisdictions and may
i8. See Little, supra note 148, at 415.
i8. See Green, supra note 15, at 89-91 (discussing some of the reasons that state disciplinary
boards receive few complaints about federal prosecutors and issue sanctions even more
rarely); Kaufman, supra note 70, at 159-60 (suggesting that state administrative systems
would be unwilling to take on the additional burden of enforcing a federal system of ethical
regulation). But see Todd S. Schulman, Note, Wisdom Without Power: The Department of
Justice's Attempt To Exempt Federal Prosecutors from State No-Contact Rules, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1o67, 1075-76 (1996) (finding that defense attorneys have "not hesitated" to refer federal
prosecutors to state disciplinary boards).
189. See Zacharias, supra note 92, at 397.
190. See Green, supra note 15, at 88.
191. See AM. BAR Ass'N, CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, STANDING COMM. ON PROF'L
DISCIPLINE, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 5-8 (2003) (providing data on the
incidence of each type of sanction across jurisdictions).
192. See Green, supra note IS, at 81 ("The impact of a public reprimand on the record at trial or,
more significantly, in a published opinion, should not be underestimated. Prosecutors are
jealous of their reputations, including their reputations for probity.").
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not be sufficiently nuanced to permit the development of finely contoured
ethical rules.
The Office of Professional Responsibility is, in some respects, in a prime
position to supervise federal prosecutors. A disciplinary proceeding conducted
before the OPR will have superior access to the facts necessary to obtain a
complete understanding of the circumstances surrounding the case. Moreover,
of the available regulators, the OPR is likely to be the most sensitive to needs
and constraints unique to federal prosecutors. Finally, since federal prosecutors
are DOJ employees, the OPR has considerable flexibility in crafting
disciplinary sanctions appropriate to the severity of the misconduct.
Nonetheless, the OPR suffers from transparency problems that limit its
ability prospectively to guide the behavior of prosecutors. Proceedings are
conducted largely in secret, and the results are often unpublished, even within
the Department of Justice itself."' If prosecutors are unable to observe how
ethical regulations are interpreted and applied in different factual
circumstances, it will be difficult for clear expectations to develop. Second, the
same concerns regarding the inability of the Department of Justice to
determine objectively its own ethical standards counsel against granting the
Department of Justice preemptive authority to discipline federal prosecutors.
Even if the proceedings could be reliably conducted without bias towards the
Department's own employees, reliance on self-regulation would stoke the
perception of the "fox guarding the henhouse."1 9 4 Continuing to improve the
disclosure of investigations and opinions, even if only internally within the
Department of Justice, is necessary if the OPR is to take a prominent role in
prosecutorial discipline.
The recognition of federal court authority to regulate attorney behavior
further complicates the enforcement regime. Any ethical misstep that produces
prejudicial error to a defendant in an ongoing proceeding must necessarily
invoke the federal courts' enforcement authority, as only the courts may
provide procedural relief to the wronged defendant. Although the issuance of
procedural relief is surely a reputational blow to the prosecutor found to have
193. See id. at 85 ("Because the OPR did not publicize its determinations, even within the
Department of Justice itself, but limited itself to identifying and privately sanctioning
wrongdoers within the Department, the OPR was also ineffective in guiding federal
prosecutors as to the bounds of appropriate conduct and deterring prosecutorial
misconduct."). Although the Department of Justice has adopted a policy of issuing public
statements when it finds that misconduct has occurred or when the investigated attorney so
requests, the underlying facts remain secret, limiting the utility of disclosure. See id. at 86.
194. Little, supra note 148, at 415; see also DAvis, supra note 18, at 158 (contending that many
attorneys would be reluctant to refer a prosecutor to the OPR on the assumption that the
disciplinary proceeding would be biased).
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violated ethical standards and a necessary step to ensure that justice is done,
courts are ill suited to provide the sort of targeted sanction needed for clear
ethical guidance."'
Courts may be wary of spelling out the precise bounds of a prosecutor's
misconduct or the requirements of an ethical rule. For example, United States v.
Williams"' considered a district court requirement that prosecutors disclose
exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. In vacating the district court's
requirement, the Supreme Court was not clear as to whether its holding was
based on excessive interference with the prosecutor or with the independence
of the grand jury.' Even if the reasoning of the Court were clear, the Court's
understanding of a regulation may diverge significantly from the text's facial
requirements.'98 Although appellate review may, in principle, unify divergent
interpretations within and between circuits, the limitations of review suggest
that considerable fragmentation would persist.
Moreover, the ability of courts to tailor penalties to the severity of the
violation is fairly limited. Although courts may dismiss an indictment,
suppress evidence, or quash a subpoena, such procedural relief for defendants
is relatively rare." 9 Even rarer is the imposition of criminal contempt.2 00
Personal sanctions for the offending prosecutor appear to be the favored
remedy.2 o' Some commentators have suggested that informal judicial remedies,
195. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
196. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
197. Zacharias & Green, supra note 179, at 1316-17; see also United States v. Hammad, 858 F2d
834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that certain uses of informants may satisfy the "authorized
by law" clause of section 7-10 4 (A)(1) (the predecessor of Model Rule 4.2), but declining to
establish precisely what those uses might be).
198. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation ofLauyers, 70 OHIO
ST. L.J. 73, 74 (2009) ("Courts in the supervisory setting have developed and implemented
doctrinal understandings that are not necessarily consistent with the codes. An ethics rule
may forbid contemplated conduct or appear to authorize the conduct, but judges evaluating
the propriety of attorneys' actual behavior do not always defer to the codes' standards; a
court may tolerate professional conduct that appears to be forbidden by a rule or proscribe
conduct that appears to be permitted.").
199. See Green, supra note 15, at 78-79. Some courts have directly expressed a preference for
disciplinary action against the offending prosecutor over procedural remedies such as the
suppression of evidence. See, e.g., Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1206-07 (Fla. 1985)
(arguing that disciplinary action, rather than the "indirect sanction of the exclusionary rule,"
was the appropriate response to a violation of the no-contact rule).
zoo. See Green, supra note 15, at 81.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (holding that the reversal of a
conviction for prosecutorial misconduct was improper and suggesting personal sanctions
instead).
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such as unfavorable scheduling or discovery orders, may be sufficient to
restrain overzealous prosecutors,202 but such remedies have only a diffuse
deterrent effect and are disconnected from the violation. It is clear that federal
courts lack the remedial flexibility of the OPR or even a state disciplinary
board.
Accordingly, prosecutors whose conduct has triggered the issuance of
procedural relief should be referred to the OPR, which both has access to
relevant mitigating information (in the form of internal policies, undisclosed
evidence or facts, etc.) and may issue narrowly targeted sanctions, for
determination of an appropriate sanction. At the very least, referral to the OPR
provides a public reprimand, in the form of a judicial opinion finding an ethical
violation, with the possibility of a further, targeted penalty. The case of a
"harmless error" should be handled in the same way. In both cases, the court
takes primary authority to investigate and make determinations as to violations
of rules that it is tasked with developing.
Ethical violations in the context of prosecutorial functions that do not
implicate the court's supervisory authority, covered by rules promulgated by
the independent ethics review commission, should be investigated and
adjudicated by that commission. If a violation is found, the case should be
referred to the OPR for determination of an appropriate sanction. In each case,
the investigatory function and subsequent determination of a violation should
be carried out by the single institution responsible for promulgating the rule
that the prosecutor stands accused of violating. Doing so would ensure that the
interpretation and application of ethical rules are consistent with the intent of
the drafters.
CONCLUSION
The regulation of the ethical decisionmaking of federal prosecutors
implicates the interests of a wide variety of institutions, at both the federal and
state levels. The conflicting ethical codes to which federal prosecutors are
subject create unnecessary regulatory turmoil and may chill legitimate exercises
of prosecutorial power. A national ethical code, specifically tailored to the
unique features and constraints of the enforcement of federal criminal laws,
may help to alleviate these problems, but the choice of who should author and
enforce these regulations requires the resolution of difficult policy questions.
These questions have no easy answers, but it is clear that uniformity requires
that prosecutors be subject to the authority of only a single regulator for each
202. See, e.g., Green, supra note 15, at 71.
182
120:144 2o1o
UNIFORM ETHICAL REGULATION OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
aspect of the prosecutorial function. The division of rulemaking, investigatory,
and disciplinary authority offered in this Note is by no means the only possible
one. However, the distribution that I have suggested limits disruption to the
existing regime while still encouraging uniform development and application
of ethical rules for federal prosecutors and minimizes conflict between various
supervisory authorities.
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